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Abstract 
We study if urban class segregation destroys social capital in Latin America using 
experimental data that are representative for six Latin American cities. In particular, 
we focus on whether belonging to upper class neighborhoods impacts reciprocity 
in a standard trust game. While our overall results confirm a negative association 
between these two variables, we also find that trusting behavior can help counteract 
the negative impact of class. 
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As a result of a combination of historical, institutional and economic reasons, many Latin 
American cities today are highly segregated by class (Johnson, 1983). This is reflected by observed 
urban patterns in which, at one extreme, upper class groups are spatially concentrated in very 
limited zones of cities—typically near financial centers as well as very specific suburban areas. At 
the other extreme, poor groups live mainly in more distant and badly serviced areas as well as in 
the deteriorated sectors that are close to the city-center (Sabatini, 2003). Whereas people from 
different neighborhoods do interact with each other in their everyday life, it is also common 
knowledge to all residents that specific neighborhoods correspond to specific classes. On average, 
class groups are very conscious of this fact and rarely socially mix. Individuals live alongside but 
separately.1 In fact, this urban segregation may impact social capital negatively.2 Worryingly, 
despite recent efforts to improve city integration (Jatiman, 2015), the current negative socio-
economic climate in the region, reflected in increased crime and exacerbated urban inequality, may 
be further conducive to the destruction of social capital.3 
In this research we study whether urban segregation is linked to social capital, and we focus 
in particular on whether social class, measured by neighborhood of provenance, contributes to the 
destruction of reciprocity or trustworthiness, a crucial element of social capital. Although some 
researchers study this question (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000), there is still no clarity on the possible 
link between these two variables, an issue that is compounded by the fact that samples tend to be 
small and not representative of any segment of the population, which may introduce bias in the 
                                                            
1 What defines social class in Latin America is a rather difficult question that researchers have tried to answer for a long time. 
While the specifics depend on each city, overall it appears to be determined by a combination of race, income, family historical 
background, and education (Angotti, 2013). 
2 https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/11/the-missing-link-between-diversity-and-community/413875/  





results. Unlike previous research, we offer three specific contributions. First, we employ 
representative data for six Latin American cities, a region that is somewhat underrepresented in 
terms of experimental research. Second, the data come from an artefactual approach that applies a 
standard “tried and true” trust game and helps us focus on our question of interest instead of design 
issues of the experiment itself. Third, while we believe very relevant, the question under 
investigation has hardly been addressed and less so using representative samples. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data, followed by a 
description of the empirical methodology. The fourth section shows our findings. The final section 
concludes. 
Data 
The data is from Cardenas et al. (2013), who performed several experimental games on the 
field using representative samples for Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San 
Jose. They collected stratified random samples where strata were chosen on the basis of education, 
income, neighborhoods, gender and age. Our research focuses on the data produced out of their 
first activity, a straightforward trust game (Cardenas et al., 2013). In this experiment, session 
participants are randomly assigned in pairs, where one half of the individuals assume the role of 
Player 1 and the other half of individuals, that of Player 2. Both groups are simultaneously located 
in different rooms, and the identities of the pairs are never revealed, although each player receives 
information on key demographic characteristics of their pairs: sex, age, schooling level, and socio-
economic stratum. In this game, both players receive an equal endowment, and Player 1 is then 
asked to decide how much of this endowment he or she wants to send to Player 2, knowing that 
Player 2 will then receive three times that amount on top of the initial endowment everyone initially 




each possible offer from Player 1, from a discrete set of fractions of amounts sent (0 percent, 25 
percent, 50 percent, 75 percent and 100 percent). As Cardenas et al. (2013) explain, doing this 
facilitates any comparisons among countries as each one has its own domestic currency. 
Immediately before making their decisions, the individuals are also asked to predict the decisions 
to be made by the other player. That is, the amount expected by Player 2 from Player 1, and Player 
1’s expected returned amount from Player 2. After both players make their decisions, the matching 
of their choices is made. This procedure allows us to separate the effects of expectations from 
those of social background (Cardenas et al., 2013).4 
Empirical Strategy 
The reduced form employed is the following: 
𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊  +  𝜷𝟐(𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊) ∗ (𝑷𝟏 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊) +  𝜹𝑿𝒊 + 𝝋𝑷𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
where 𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 is defined by the return ratio (the percentage of the return as a fraction of 
the final disposable endowment). In other words, this variable captures the amount that Player 2 
returns to Player 1 after the latter makes his initial move in the trust game. 𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊 is a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if Player 2 belongs to an upper-class neighborhood, and 0 if this is not the 
case. (𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊) ∗ (𝑷𝟏 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊) , is the interaction between the amount sent by Player 1 and 
whether Player 2 comes from an upper class neighborhood. A positive ?̂?𝟐 implies that participants 
tend to reciprocate proportionally, conditional on the amount offered by Player 1. In addition, 𝑿𝒊 
represents a vector of control variables of individual i, which include sex, education, race, whether 
the individual is employed, the degree of risk aversion of the individual, a positive offer in a 
                                                            
4 Cardenas, et al. (2013) also collected data from other experimental games, in particular, a voluntary contributions game and a risk 





voluntary contribution game, household size and whether the individual is the head of the 
household. 𝑷𝒊 is a vector of control variables of individual i matched Player 1. Finally, 𝜺𝒊 is the 
error term. All regressions include city and session fixed effects. In addition, in the all regressions 
the errors are clustered at the city-session level. Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables 
employed in this research. 
Findings 
Table 2 shows our results. In column 1 we provide evidence that individuals coming from 
upper-class neighborhoods tend to reciprocate less, as the reciprocated amount from Player 2 to 
Player 1 is reduced by around 6.6 percentage points with respect to the final endowment. 
Segregation and urban inequality may have a negative bearing on social capital. Interestingly, this 
result is countered by the fact that individuals are compelled to reciprocate larger amounts the 
larger the initial offer of Player 1 is. That is, when Player 2 comes from an upper-class 
neighborhood, we find that the more trusting Player 1 is, the more trustworthy Player 2 will be 
and, thus, will reciprocate a larger amount. Having said this, the overall impact of belonging to an 
upper-class neighborhood remains negative, on average.  
The second column in Table 2 highlights the fact that when we control for the expected 
offer of Player 1, we still find the same results as when this variable is not included, as both of our 
variables of interest maintain their corresponding signs and remain statistically significant at 
conventional levels, although, as expected, the size of the interacted coefficient drops from 0.11 
to 0.08. Interestingly, we still find that when Player 2 comes from an upper-class neighborhood, 
the original amount extended by Player 1 to Player 2 still motivates the latter to reciprocate 





We study if urban class segregation destroys social capital in Latin America. In order to do 
this, we use experimental data that identifies upper class neighborhoods in six cities and focus on 
whether reciprocity is negatively impacted in a standard trust game. While our overall results 
confirm a negative association between class and reciprocity, we also find an important silver 
lining. It appears that trusting behavior and goodwill can help counteract the negative impact of 
class. Individuals from upper-class neighborhoods that are trusted appear to be willing to 
reciprocate accordingly. This is potentially good news from a policy perspective, as governments 
may want to consider mechanisms that make particularly salient issues related to goodwill and 
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Table 1. Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Return ratio 1,533 0.28 0.21 0 1 
Upper Neighborhood 1,570 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Player 1 Offer 1,545 0.45 0.28 0 1 
Player1 Expected Offer 1,567 0.48 0.29 0 1 
Player 2 Sex 1,574 0.55 0.5 0 1 
Player 2 Age 1,571 36.99 14.48 17 77 
Player 2 Secondary 1,574 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Player 2 Higher Education 1,574 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Player 2 Employment 1,574 0.7 0.46 0 1 
Player 2 Caucasian 1,560 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Player 2 Household Head 1,574 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Player 2 Household Size 1,569 4.03 1.79 1 15 
Player 2 Low Risk Aversion 1,573 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Player 2 Mid Risk Aversion 1,573 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Player 2 Part in Vol Cont Game 1,572 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Player 1 Sex 1,556 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Player 1 Upper Neighborhood 1,574 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Player 1 Age 1,552 37.56 14.62 17 80 
Player 1 Secondary 1,574 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Player 1 Higher Education 1,574 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Player 1 is the first mover in the trust game. Player 2, or second mover, is the 
individual that reciprocates the amount initially offered by Player 1. All of these 






Table 2. Determinants of Reciprocity 
  (1) (2)   
Upper Neighborhood -0.0665*** -0.0567**  
 (0.0254) (0.0239)  
Player 1 Offer 0.0128 0.0258  
 (0.0297) (0.0279)  
Upper Neighborhood * 
Player 1 Offer 0.116** 0.0858**  
 (0.0473) (0.0432)  
Expected Player 1 Offer  0.212***  
  (0.0209)  
Constant 0.0824 -0.0004  
 (0.0510) (0.0494)      
Observations 1,509 1,505  
R-squared 0.210 0.279  
Session FE Yes Yes  
City FE Yes Yes   
The dependent variable is the percentage of the final endowment returned by 
Player 2 to Player 1. The final Player 2 endowment is composed as the sum of 
the initial endowment of Player 2 and Player 1 offer multiplied by three. All 
regressions include sex, age, education, race, employment dummy, degree of 
(experimental) risk aversion, dummy for contributing in an (experimental) 
voluntary contributions game, household head dummy and household size. 
 
